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Michael lIg

Imposing Self-Interest: Behavioural Law
and Economics, the Ultimatum Game,
and Value Possibilities

With the recent emergence ofthe behaviouralapproach to lawandeconomics, there
is nowa systematic critique of law and economics which remains sympathetic to its
overall objectives. Rather than seek to undermine traditional law and economics,
the intent of the behavioural approach is generally to augment it, and render its
formulations more representative of reality Drawing upon experimental evidence
and well-known examples of anomalies within economic theory, behavioural
scholars claim that the law needs to better account for instances of individual
irrationality Having identified the situations when rational maximization does not
hold, behavioural scholars are then able to propose ways to help individuals
"get it right," or maximize properly. Unfortunately, the conservative ambitions of
the behavioural scholars have not done justice to their source matenal. There
is more to human endeavour, and the regulation of it, than varying degrees of
correspondence to market rationality Evidence reveals that individual values are
independent of both the market and government, with the potential for fairness
existing alongside self-interest in the thought patterns inherent to individuals.
In using a prominent example from the behavioural catalogue, the ultimatum
game, the author argues that rationality and irrationality do not occupy a binary
relationship, as in either present or not present. but may instead be fluid within the
same context. In the ultimatum game, self-interest is both dependent upon, and
also secondary to, the availability of fairness considerations. To grasp this reality
requires a theoretical framework more expansive than the maximization universe
of law and economics, behavioural or otherwise.
Dans la foulde de I'dmergence r~cente de I'approche comportementale du droit
et de I'dconomie, on assiste I expression d'une critique systematique de ces
deux disciplines qui reste ndanmoins sympathique aux objectifs globaux de
cette nouvelle approche. Lapproche comportementale ne cherche pas tant .
6branler le droit et r'conomie traditionnels quA les enrichir et ' faire en sorte
que leurs formulations soient plus representatives de la rdalitd. S'inspirant de
16vidence expdrimentale et dexemples bien connus d'anomalies dans la theorie
6conomique, les sp~cialistes du comportement avancent qu'il est n~cessaire que
le droit tienne mieux compte des cas dirrationaiti individuelle. Ayant d~fini les
situations ou la maximisation rationnelle ne sapphque pas, les sp~cialistes du
comportement sont ensuite en mesure de proposer des moyens pour aider les
individus , adopter un comportement correct ou 6 maximiser leur comprdhension.
Malheureusement, les ambitions prudentes des sp6cialistes du comportement
nont pas rendu justice aux donn6es initiales utilis~es. Le comportement
humain, et sa r~glementation, est beaucoup plus vaste que les divers degrds de
correspondance 6 la rationaitO des marches. L65vidence r~v~le que les valeurs
individuelles sont ind6pendantes tant des march6s que des gouvernements, et
que le potentiel d'6quitd c6toie Iintdrdt personnel dans le scheme de pensde
inherent i chaque individu. Utilisant un exemple bien connu tir du registre des
comportements, le jeu de Iultimatum, rauteur cherche A d~montrer quil n y a
pas, entre la rationalit6 et rirrationalit6,une relation binaire comme celle qui
existe entre presence et absence, mais que cette relation peut etre fluide dans
le meme contexte. Dans le jeu de I'ultimatum, Iint6r~t personnel est ' la fois
tributaire de Iexistence de considerations en mati~re d'quit6 et secondaire i ces
considerations. Pour saisir cette rdalit, ilfaut un cadre d'action thsorique plus
vaste que I'univers de maximisation du droit et de l'6conomie, comportemental
ou autre.

142

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I.
[I.
Ill.
IV.
V.

Methods of Scepticism
From Normative to Descriptive Challenges
BehaviouralEvidence
Regulating Irrationality
The Ultimatum Game and Simultaneous Values

Conclusion

Introduction
LaN% and economics scholars tend to rely upon a notion of individuality
incorporated from economic theory. wvhich assumes that individuals are
rational maximizers of their own self-interest. A straightforward definition
of self-interested maximization is given by Richard Posner as simply
"choosing the best means to the chooser's ends."' While the rationality
assumption has been controversial since its introduction to legal analysis,2
it has also lent law and economics much of its theoretical coherency and

force." Individual rationality supports both the abstract calculations from
which modem law and economics currently expands, and the broader
normativejustifications for a system said to reflect free choice in the market.
In an ideal sense, if rationality characterizes choice, then individual actions
within a marketplace become an aggregation of free will; a democratic
collection of personal %aluations and choice.4 The question posed here is
I. Richard A. Posner, "Rational Choice, Behav ioral
Economics and the Law" (1997-1998)50 Stan.
L. Rev. 1551. Generally, individuals are thought to he rational maximi/ers of their own self-interest
to the extent that the. pursue preferences, economic or otherw'ise, which are consistent or relatively
constant. Simply, the definition of rationalitN need only demand that inx iduals are not internally
sporadic in %%
hat the, desire, and that they seek the most effective means to achie e these desires.
2. Christine Jolls. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, "A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics" (I
1997-1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 14" I [JST]. See e.g, Mark Kelman, "Consumption Theory,
Production Theor., and Ideology in the Coase Theorem" 11979) 52 S.Cal. L. Re-. 669; Duncan
Kenned), "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique" (1981) 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387;
Arthur Allen Leff, "Economic ,Analysis o"the La%% Some Realism and Nominalism" (1974)60 Va. L.
Re\ .451
3. Nec c g. Samuel Isacharoll; "Can There Be a Beha\ ioral La\ and Economics"(1998)51 Vand.
L. ReN 1730.
4
The essential joining of free markets, and especiall\ private property, with the promotion of
indixidual liberty is often associated with the Uni\ersity of Chicago, and the neo-liberal philosophy
espoused by the likes of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. See e.g.. Friedrich A. von Hayek.
Thc Road o Se rfdom (LiUnversity of Chicago Press, 1972). layek offers a defense of Lockean rights
and neutral individual liberty, equating goxemment regulation with the threat of totalitarianism. For
an interesting discussion of the academic connection between rational choice and the politics of the
Cold War, see S. M Amadae, Ralionalizing ("quialhsi Democracyv The Cold War Origins ofRational
(lmowe Liheralsm, (Chicago: Unix ersity of Chicago Press. 2003).
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whether it is valid to make this move from individual rationality to market
conclusions. If individuals do not always fi our self-interest, as evidence
suggests, it does not necessarily follow that market solutions reflect
voluntary choice and valuations. Indeed, assuming an overly narrow view
of rationality may have the unintended result of imposing arbitrary ends
upon individuals.
While the most virulent, and often the most poignant, critiques of
law and economics have involved normative challenges to its assignment
of social priorities, 5 more recent developments in the literature question
its descriptive accuracy. Drawing upon experimental evidence and
well-known examples of anomalies within economic theory, a new
"behavioural approach" attempts to augment law and economics so as
to account for instances of indiN idual irrationality. Irrationality, and with
it rationality, have been subsumed vithin the greater economic view of
law, aligning irrational behaviour with moti\ ations that do not afford with
self-interest. The terms and definition of rational behaviour have been set
by the economic approach to law, and behavioural law and economics
scholars enter the field to revise within the parameters already determined.
Therefore, if traditional law and economics posits that individuals
maximize, the behavioural response may be characterized as conforming
to the "yes, but" variety - seeking to identi k- the situations when rational
maximization does not hold and then orchestrating regulation to help
individuals "get it right."
Unfortunately, the conservative ambitions of the behavioural scholars
have not done justice to their source material. In using experimental
evidence to argue for bureaucratic tinkering to achieve the same ends
as law and economics efficiency. the behavioural approach obscures the
extent to which these experimental results point to different individual
ends. There is more to human endeavour, and the regulation of it, than
varying degrees of correspondence to market rationality. Evidence reveals
values to be independent of both the market and government, \with the

5. The most notable is perhaps the liberal critique, shich generally argues that furthering the
systemic goal of economic efficiency. b, equating ability to pay uith an equality of dtlire. does not
treat individuals as "ends in themsel es." See Ronald D% orkin, "-i Wealth a Value?" ( 1980) 9 Journal
of Legal Studies. For more on the incompatibility of ability to pay with the assumption of voluntary
preferences, see e.g., Guido Calabresi, "'The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further" (19901991) 100 Yale L. J.; Jules Coleman, Efficiencj; Udin- and ;lealh Alaximizalion. in Alarktls, A rla/s,.
and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 09) at 95-132: (wshich argues that that there
can be no cardinal, or one to one, correspondence between ability to pay and individual measures of
desire, happiness. etc. Therefore, though law and economics espouses maximization in the utilitarian
sense, it does not meet the standard of utilitarianism and the promotion of a sum good of happiness, or
whatever value).
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potential for fairness existing alongside self-interest in the thought patterns
inherent to individuals.
In what follows I argue that anomalies of self-interest may signify
much more theoretical import than behavioural scholars have thus far
demonstrated. My object is to show that the structure of competitive rules
influences the availability and likelihood of certain inherent values, such as
fairness, manifesting themselves in individual behaviour. The implication
is that, regardless of the normative priorities of a legal system, the status
quo may not be said to reflect a natural state of individual preferences, nor
human nature as a given constant. Even though the law may often favour
a priority of individual self-interest, this need not mean that it must do so
exclusively, or that it should do so.
In using a prominent example from the behavioural catalogue, the
ultimatum game, I wish to demonstrate that rationality and irrationality
do not exist in a binary relationship, either present or not present, but
may instead be fluid within the same context. There are instances, as my
discussion ofthe ultimatum game in part V will show, when a similar context
may yield differing value choices of individuals based on the structure of
competition. In the ultimatum game, self-interest is both dependent upon,
and also secondary to, the availability of fairness considerations. To grasp
this reality requires a theoretical framework more expansive than the
maximization universe of law and economics, behavioural or otherwise.
That individuals act contrary to economic theory, and act in
accordance with general principles of fairness, need not be taken as merely
a correctable anomaly. The inefficient instances of individual choice, or
sub-optimal games, may be seen as constraints on individuals' freedom
to choose otherwise; to articulate inherent principles not recognized by
the market. The continuing relevancy of non-economic concerns should
at the very least point toward the desirability of designing legal rules
that recognize both self-interest and social fairness. Both descriptive and
normative elements of the law could well be improved if individuals are
free to manifest their preferences in different ways, across theoretical
categories.
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1.Methods of Scelpticism
As with the economic theory that inspires it, law and economics is often
clothed in the congratulatory rubric of science.' The economic field's
foremost methodological expression remains Milton Friedman's famous
essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics," which articulates
a Popperian standard of falsification.- In keeping with Popper's ideal
of scientific inquiry as providing falsifiable claims, Friedman argues
that the measure of economic theory should not be the accuracy of its
basic assumptions but the accuracy of its predictions - its testability.'
Specifically. in Friedman's words: [,]iewed as a body of substantive
hypotheses, theory is to be judged bN its predictive power for the class of
phenomena which it is intended to 'explain. "'
Whether individual maximization is in fact the prime motivator of
human behaviour is secondary to the ability of this conception to further
the practical objectives of society. Economic prediction is thus seen as
analogous to that of science, providing insight into how observable
results come about, and how forces react and join into future outcomes. If
market exchange is conceived of as the current paradigm, or predominant
worldview within western society, individual maximization is then held out
to be the best explanation for Nhv collective market outcomes occur. t0
The foundational assumption upon which economic formulations
and abstractions are built is individual rationality, or the model of
rational choice. Though rational choice theory is a widely used and often
imprecise label, its application to legal analysis generally conforms to
the market view of individual behaviour espoused by Gary Becker, an
approach summarized in his aptly titled Nobel acceptance article "The

6. 1 refer here to the most prominent approach to la% and economics, that of the Chicago law
school. The Chicago school (also commonly referred to as the conventional, traditional, or classical
approach), closely mirrors the tree market program made famous by the Chicago school of economics,
and its influential members such as Nlilton Fnedman. A good introduction to law and economics.
including Chicago and other subsequent schools, may be found in Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G.
Medema, Economics and the Law From Posner to Post- tiodernism, (Princeton: Princeton Uni\ ersity
Press, 1997).
7. "Factual evidence can never 'prove' a hypothesis, it can only disprove it." Milton Friedman,
"The Methodology of Positisc Economics," in Es.sa is in Positive Economics (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1953) at 9. For a discussion of Frideman's methodology and its place within the
economics field, as well as Friedman's "instrumentalism" and following of Popper, see Lawrence A.
Boland & William Frazer, "An Essay on the Foundations of Friedman's Methodology" (Mar. 1983) 73
American Economic Review 129.
8. Friedman, ibid. at 4.
9. Friedman, ibid. at 8.
10. Ibid. at 5 (claiming that differences of economic policy "derive predominantly from different
predictions about the consequences of taking - differences that in principle can be eliminated by the
progress of positive economics - rather than from fundamental differences").
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Economic Way of Looking at Life."' Becker's influential attempts at socalled economic imperialism, or the extension of the economic method
to traditionally non-economic fields, is justified with the claim that the
existence of three simple criteria Nvithin areas of social behaviour merits
an economic perspective. These criteria may be described as: individual
maximization, stable preferences, and general equilibrium. The first two
criteria may be seen to describe a model of rational choice, joining the
self-interested pursuit of atomistic goals with the rationality of doing so
in a consistent manner. The third criterion, that of general equilibrium,
describes the systemic outcomes of rational choice, in which competition
is the sum of disparate strategies that combine into predictable trends, such
as the inverse relationship between supply and price.
Evident in Becker's characterization, as with economic theory in
general, is an explanatory interdependence between individual and
system. A unique relationship exists between the individual agent and
the prediction of system operations; as the conception of individual
maximization permits for abstract predictions of the whole, the system also
determines the parameters of individual interest perception. Therefore, the
assumption of individual maximization is a dependent theory of the self,
for its descriptive content relies on market results to validate a conception
of individual behaviour (or human nature). Individual behaviour, even
that of the rational maximizing kind, is not measurable objectively, or
separate from human influence, in the same way that physical phenomena
are. Where physics students may predict the behaviour of a moving body
based upon the surrounding environmental forces that impact upon it,
such as friction or gravity, those engaged in human study are observing
the effects of factors which are dependent to a large extent upon social
determination.
From the assumption that most human behaviour conforms to market
rationales, since individuals maximize their consistent preferences, has
developed the central law and economics tenet that rules act as prices on
behaviour. Again, the object is to predict how external signals that enter
indi\ idual contemplation, whether rules or other forms of prices, effect
indi\idual strategies and coalesce in collective outcomes. While the
study of rules as prices uses a unique economic nomenclature, it is not
a particularly radical approach. Indeed, studying the impact of law upon
behaviour has long been a staple of law and society. 2 The radical departure
I.

Gary Becker. "'he Economic W\', of Looking at Life" (Nobel Prize Acceptance Lecture, 9

I)cceniher 199,J2), online: Nobelpri/e.org <http://nobelprize.org economics/ laureates/I992/beckerlecture.html -,

12

\lark Kclman. "Legal Economists and Normati\ e Social Theory" in Mark Kelman, ed., A Guide

to ( rtticalLegal Studie. ((ambridge. Mass.: Harvard Uni\ crsity Press, 1987) at 115.
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of law and econonics occurs through its reliance upon, and often explicit
embrace of, the ideology of neo-liberal economics.
While a powerful explanatory tool is undoubtedly provided for by
economic theory, it is contingent upon society's continued allegiance
to neo-liberal economic norms. Friedman's methodological statement
implicitly acknowledges as much. The claimed correspondence between
economic theory and the Popperian ideal of scientific falsification is the
primary justification, but Friedman's view contains an additional, and
perhaps inconsistent, reliance on a Kuhnian concept of paradigms. 3 For
though Friedman claims that no single theory can explain the complexities
of the entire economy, or arrive at the truth (as with Popper), he also
acknowledges that the determinant of economic predictions is social. On the
one hand, objectivity is held out to be possible on the basis of the testability
of economic predictions, %vhileon the other, the social composition of the
economy is a matter of public policy and debate.' Friedman's scientific
aspirations for economic theory may be seen to proceed along the following
lines. First, if an accurate picture of human behaviour is not provided for
by the narrowing of individual experience that occurs with the assumption
of rational maximization, at least economic theory provides testable
predictions on hov individual behaviour will manifest itself in the market.
Second, even if the predictive ideal should falter, economic theory has
yet to be replaced as the dominant explanatory model for a market-based
society. Justification thus moves from an independent ideal of scientific
inquiry, testability or falsification, to rest upon a general correspondence
to what most people currently accept as true.
Friedman's expression of methodology has perhaps been so persuasive
within the economics community because of its categorical approach,
which has in turn been very influential upon the law and economics
school's most categorical proponent, Richard Posner. Posner's voluminous
output contains not only an expression of sympathy to Friedman's views,
but also signals a more profound shadowing of its intellectual progression.
First, Posner shares with Becker a viewv of individuals as maximizers of
13. Kuhn's arguments on the social determinants of research popularized the notion of"paradigms,"
and the idea that science is composed of revolutionary breaks rather than linear or constant progress.
"For Kuhn science is always dominated by one paradigm that its members pursue religiously until it
runs up to limits of its puzzle-solving capabilities." Steven Fuller, Kuhn vs Popper (Cambridge: Icon
Books, 2003) at 55. Central to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm shift was academic hierarchy, and the elite
within a discipline that would lead the acceptance of new research programs. See generally, Thomas
S.Kuhn, The StructureofScientific Revolutions, 3d ed., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996)
at 10. A paradigm was revolutionary, not solely because of its empirical accuracy, but in part because
it was "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners
to resolve."
14. Boland & Frazer, supra note 7 at 130.
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their preferences, broadly conceived of as self-interested advancements
of desire not limited to pure market transactions. Predicting behaviour,
in the Popperian fashion, is thus possible because of the consistency of
individual maximization. Second, Posner claims that since we live within
a market economy, increases in market size,'6 or wealth maximization,
ought to be law's object.'7 Therefore, Posner, as with Friedman before him,
offers a formalized version of economic quasi-science, only to ultimately
rely upon the social acceptance of the current paradigm of economic
competition to justify his position. And so it is that Posner may claim
allegiance to both Popperian science," and the pragmatic justification of
representing the dominant paradigm of the day.19
The scientific aspirations of economic theory make for an interesting
sociological study of academic influence and fashion, but also provide a
ready division for how critiques of law and economics are addressed. The
distinction between Popperian and Kuhnian views, even in the gross oversimplification given here, involves more than a debate over the nature of
scientific history, or how science has progressed; it invokes an implicit
consideration as to how a dominant worldview might be challenged.
It could be said that a specific questioning of a theory's predictions is
Popperian in nature, while a systemic challenge to a dominant thought
system endorsed by a social group, or paradigm, represents a Kuhnianstyle challenge.

I. From ,Vormative to Descriptive Challenges
Initially, legal scholars opposed to the law and economics approach, or
least its normati\ e and philosophical pretensions that extended beyond law
and society-type analysis, were apt to reject a market conceptualization
of law. -0 The most forceful critiques of the past tended to attack law
and economics for its assumptions that individual ends are represented
by market transactions, as if reflecting a sum equation of happiness in
a weak version of utilitarianism. 21 Despite the force of these critiques,
however, the arguments have been susceptible to the impasse faced by
15. Po'ncr. supra note I.
16 Als,o termed potential Parcto improvements, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see, e.g., Mercuro &
Mcdema, supra note 6 at 13-21; Calabresi, supra note 5; Coleman, supra note 5.
17. "'Wealth maximi/ation" is Posner's popularized version of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Richard
A. Po'sner, "Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory" (1979) 8 J. Leg. Stud. 103; Mercuro &
Medema, iupqra note 6 at I19,
18. Posner, vipra note I at 1560.
19 See Richard A. Po'ner, "'What Ilas Pragmatism to Offer Law'?" in Michael Brint & William
Wca\ or, eds, Progmari.m in Law and Socien. (Philadelphia: \Vestview Press, 1991) at 29.
2(1 Pre\ ious and noteworthy critiques include: Ronald Dworkin, "Is Wealth a Value?" (1980) 9
J. Leg. Stud., Mark Kclman., vqpra note 12 at 114-150; Arthur Alan Leff.supra note 2 at 451482;
21
sce v g., Coleman, supra note 5.
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most normative challenges: namely, since it is not thct-based, and does not
point to distinct factual contradictions, it may be ignored as safely external
to societv's dominant structural assumptions. So if law and economics may
be challenged for deriving an ought from an is, it may equally be said that
challenging an ought with another ought is unlikely to prove persuasive to
those intent on maintaining the status quo. Put differently, the claim that
another paradigm ought to hold sway. and that another constellation of
values ought to inform public life, is easily ignored for not corresponding
to what currently is. The idea that "what is, ought to be" may not be overly
imaginative, but it is nonetheless difficult to supplant.
Exceptions to the descriptive validity of law and economics, which
avoid the moral indeterminacy of prior normati\ e challenges, have grown
in frequency within recent years. Part of this groving descriptive debate
may be explained by the direction of law and economics itself. As Russell
Korobkin and Thomas Ulen have observed, law and economics has
steadily been devolving into a sub-discipline of applied economics, with
the desire for mathematical elegance taking priority over usefulness to
legal study.22 The pressure for law and economics scholars to arrive at new,
mathematically driven applications has resulted in a form of nominal legal
analysis which is inscrutable to those -whose training and professional focus
remains tied to a more pedestrian notion of law. While the application of
topology or invariance theory2- to widget regulation would no doubt awe
the editors of law and economics journals. the relevance to legal study
would likely remain obscure to mathematical novices.
The increased abstraction and formalization of law and economics
scholarship has only served to make its lack of descriptive engagement with
legal reality more overt. As legal scholars have become more conversant
with the anomalies within the economic model of rationality, long known
to economists, they have seemingly become more secure in challenging
law and economics scholars' monopoly on economic rationality. Drawing
upon experimental evidence gathered from behavioural sciences,
psychology, and the fringes of economic theory, a new behavioural
approach has attempted to reform law and economics so as to account for
instances of individual irrationality. Having entered the fray, the question
becomes: what use have behavioural law and economics scholars made of
their newfound knowledge of human behaviour? Has it led to new tools,
or a fixing of the old?

22. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, "Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics" (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1053.
23. These forms of mathematical study were chosen randomly and hypothetically.
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The lessons from the descriptive inadequacies of economic theory may
be interpreted in different fashions. In addressing the scientific pretensions
of economic theory, the adopted view of scientific inquiry may indicate the
likelihood that initial scepticism of the economic program may lead to its
outright rejection as a valid theory. On the one hand, a Popperian concern
with scientific falsification, and the testability of empirical observations
appears to represent the scientific ideal, yet, it also permits a more
incremental, or even conservative, approach. The concern about specific
factual inaccuracies, as when a descriptive hypothesis is offered and then
compared with observable results, may be advanced in a piecemeal fashion,
with only the most overtly inconsistent parts of the theory rejected.
As behavioural law and economics illustrates, when one begins with
the assumption that a theoretical framework should be retained, the object
becomes incorporating new information, or techniques, to compensate for
obviously incorrect conclusions - in effect, resuscitating the most flagging
points of the theory. But this specific form of theoretical accommodation
may be more socially determined than is commonly assumed. A more
cynical social critique would find that specific accommodations are often
nothing more than an attempt of scholars to retain their professional
investment in a theorv. e, en in the face of its apparent inconsistencies and
ripeness for replacement. In this x ay, the move toward greater abstraction
on the part of laxv and economics scholars may be read as ignoring
empirical inconsistencies for the sake of theoretical sustenance alone."4
With careers tied to the continued prevalence of a research program, the
ideal of scientific objectivity may not always apply to the physical sciences,
much less to economics.
The social determination of science usually invokes a pragmatic, or
competitive theory of scientific progress."5 Scientific knowledge, then,
is seen as the reflection of what most people within a given community,
in this case a scientific discipline such as physics, believe to be true at
a given time. The essential ingredient becomes acceptance and use by
the majority, not objective truth. Therefore, from Kuhn's discussion of
scientific communities extends the hackneyed notion that it "takes a theory
24 Sec Imre Lakatos. "Falsification and the .1ethodolog of Scientific Research Programmes" in
Imrc Lakatis & Alan Niusgrase. eds., Criticism and the Growth otKnowledge 91 at i il (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. I970): (in which Lakatos argues that research programs "degenerate"
when secondary exceptions and accommodations are thrown up by researchers in an attempt to explain
as a. anomalies. rhe result is that the explanatory "'core"
of the theory is lessened). See Jeanne L.
Ischroedcr, "The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of La' and Economics"(1998-1999) 112 Harv.
L.Rev. 493.
25. The social definition of truth plays not on[% a part in the work of those such as Kuhn and Lakatos,
it is also reflected in the philosophy of pragmatism, and subsequently, legal pragmatism. See generally
Brint & Weaver supro note 19.
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to beat a theory."26 Although the requirement that a successful argument
must advance an alternative theory to the status quo is not particularly
nuanced, -7 the idea does bear some relevance to the present treatment
of behavioural law and economics. The lack of theoretical framework
on the part of behavioural approaches given to date is not a secondary
consideration. Advocating for the inclusion of the anomalies of rationality
within the traditional school of law and economics is a significant choice,
meaning that the reading of these findings is not to threaten the wider
principles upon which the classical paradigm rests. Since the behavioural
approach begins explicitly from the assumption that the law and economics
program should be supported and augmented, 2' the question becomes
whether a meaningful contribution can be made from this start position.
The following section summarizes the basic form of the behavioural
evidence, and then discusses the implications of its given treatment in the
hands of the behavioural scholars to date.
III. Behavioural Evidence
Arguments for a behavioural approach to law and economics have
generally proceeded in the following manner: evidence of rational
inconsistencies within the classical paradigm are trotted out, and it is then
argued that this evidence demands inclusion within the la~v and economics
program.29 Evidence from the behavioural sciences often shows individuals
in a light distinct from the self-interested choosers who are able to make
neutral assessments of the world around them. Essentially, individuals
often display preferences that are not in keeping with rational assessments
of either value or risk.
First, in terms of valuation, individual behaviour may often correspond
with the endowment effect. in which individuals tend to prefer their
current holdings above what their exchange value might be.30 A common
example of the endowment effect is a ticket to a sought-after event or
performance, in which individuals are seen to be unwilling to sell their
ticket for an amount that they themselves would be unwilling to pay to
replace the ticket. For example, a ticket-holder who purchased their ticket
for S50 might be unwilling to sell it for S500, even though they would
26. See Schroeder, supra note 24
27. Ibid,
28. See e.g., JST, supra note 2; ThomaN S. Ulen, -The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and
Economics" (1998) 51 Vand. L. Re%.1747; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, supra note 22.
29. As the approach is yet young there can be no categorical pronouncements. I refer
here, then,
to the beginnings of an approach. The works of JST and Korobkin and Ulen may be said to be fairly
representative, and the most comprehensive expressions of this new school of law and economics.
30. A good discussion of endowment effect may be found in Issacharoff, supra note 3,as well as
JST, supra note 2.
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not pay $500 for the same ticket. In this instance of unwilling scalping,
individuals will neither realize the profits of their tickets' appreciation, nor
themselves value the ticket at that appreciated amount were they without
it. This is contrary to rational predictions of maximization, and the law
and economics tenet that initial distributions have no impact upon final
allotments, as it leaves an unaccounted-for valuation that is biased toward
current possession. Law and economics, following the Coase theorem,
predicts that goods will always move to their most efficient usage, and to
the party who is willing to pay the most to use or possess the resource.3'
What the endowment eflect illustrates, however, is that individuals do not
always surrender themselves to market incentives, and in doing so prohibit
markets from "'clearing," or allocating goods in the most profitable manner
possible.
Individual value assessments may also be irrational in the treatment of
costs already incurred, or "sunk costs." In a similar vein to the endowment
effect, the well-known fallacy of sunken costs reveals that individuals
favour possessive impulses above purely neutral calculations. Economic
theory predicts that individuals ought to ignore sunken costs for the logical
reason that they are costs already incurred, and therefore, should not
inform present decisions. Returning to the theme of tickets, an example
would be the season ticket-holder to the theatre. The annual subscriber
who feels reluctant to venture out for an evening of entertainment should
consider this impulse in isolation, without regard to the costs incurred in
the past since that money is already spent and gone. However, evidence
suggests the contrary, as individuals tend to think that they will lose their
investment, or that their money vill have been wasted, if they do not attend
the performance: - This example, perhaps more than most, displays the
limitations of rational choice theory. Whereas maximization only looks
to the money involved - money spent on a season's subscription is money
gone, so individuals should move on and think not of it again - individuals
are often found to equate money with its underlying purpose of exchange.
The subscriber paid their money to see performances, maximizing some
artistic interest perhaps, and will continue to view their sunk costs in terms
of this equation between their initial outlay and their initial object. Even
though the artistic performance Nvill not register in a monetary sense, as the
costs are sunken or lost, individuals will still think of honouring their prior
intent. In this regard, their obligation shifts from market forces, of getting

31.

Ronald Coase,. "The Problem of Social Cost" (Oct. 19601 3 J.L. & Econ. 1; see also, Calabresi,

vupra note 5,

32. For further discussion of this e\ample, as \\ell as potential rational choice responses, see
Korokhin & Ulen. supra note 22 at 1107.
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ahead in the usual manner, to revolve around the question of whether or
not to maintain the goal they marked out for themselves earlier. "
The second major form of irrational valuation concerns individuals'
assessments of risk, and their own relation to it. Generally, individuals
are likely to favour themsel es in calculations of risk, often to their own
detriment. For example, a high percentage of individuals might think
of themsel\es as above-average drivers."4 Obviously, statistical reality
disproves most people's complimentary assessments of themselves, driving
or otherwise, and denotes that most people are, well, average. Individuals,
then, might not make rational decisions. by improperly weighing certain
risks involved in their behaviour for example. when they overestimate their
own abilities or predilections. The case of retirement savings is a common
example. Individuals may think of themselves as rational in the long-term,
and assume that they will make regular contributions to their retirement
savings, while in the short-term they may continually forsake those same
instalments for other expenditures that more readily promote their present
enjoyment. Mandaton retirement plans are thus seen as a way to mitigate
individual impulses and overcome a lack of rational discipline. A difficulty
of course would be distinguishing when the adoption of mandatory
investment should be voluntary, and undertaken privately, and when
government should mandate such a scheme for everyone, spendthrifts and
misers alike.
Apart from the individual's preference for favouring their abilities
above rational calculations, there also is the phenomenon of individuals
favouring that which is nearest to their own experience. Events tend to
become distorted from their actual statistical probability when considered
by most individuals. Specifically, an e' ent that is known to have occurred
may lead to an incorrect assessment ofthe likelihood that a similar event will
occur again, or even to an incorrect assessment of that event's likelihood
of occurring in the first place. These skewed assessments of immediate
experience are characterized as the "'hindsight bias." On the one hand, this
tendency is particularly relevant for regulatory scrutiny, as public demands
for protection often are a response to the last catastrophe given widespread
media attention; meanwhile more dangerous, and more everyday, concerns
are overlooked. 35 On the other hand, this tendency is relevant for common
law determinations of tortious liability in that individuals, in the form of
juries and judges, tend to equate a chance occurrence with its inevitability.

33. Ibid
34. Claire A. Hill, "'Beyond Mistakes; The Next Wa~e of Behavioural Law and Economics" (2004)
29 Queen's L. . 567.
35. JSTsupranote2at 1518-21.
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That an accident did occur tends to prejudice a later view of the probabilities
as they appeared to the individual considering what course of action to
take.3 Where there might have been a twenty per cent chance that an
omission would lead to an accident, when an accident occurs, and people
are later scrutinizing that same choice, there is a tendency to increase
instinctively the likelihood of the accident happening. In this regard, the
hindsight bias serves to impute what we do know into what should have
been known. Taken together, the evidence suggests that it is difficult for
individuals to transcend their situation rationally; to either ignore what
has occurred most sensationally and recently, or to consider the statistical
probabilities present before an event came about.
IV. Regulating I)-rationality
The most significant issue arising from the potential application of the
behavioural sciences to law is not whether these situations of irrationality
are accurate, or involve important fields of regulation, but how a systemic
approach to the law may be developed from these findings. Even the most
unyielding proponent of classical law and economics would acknowledge
that the model of rationality is derivative and open to exceptions. Indeed,
the classical approach is derivative by design, in the stated cause of
providing testable predictions of human behaviour. But if a model of
individual behaviour is to arise from evidence of irrationality," a difficult
move from specific instances of irrationality on the individual level
to theoretical coherence on the systemic level must be made. As yet, a
principled argument for making such a move has not been articulated. This
conceptual flaw exists, it is suggested, because a theoretical framework for
regulation may not extend from the incoherent view of individuality which
underlies the behavioural approach.
While many behavioural scholars have thus far limited themselves
to vague calls for the incorporation of knowledge from the behavioural
sciences into law and economics, a few have been bold enough to extend
their treatment into calls for actual impact. In their excellent article, "A
Beha\ ioral Approach to Law and Economics," Christine Jolls, Cass
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler (-JST"), combine a comprehensive treatment
of rational anomalies with an ambitious call for the development of a
behavioural model that would contain both descriptive and prescriptive
elements." The prescriptive element of their work may be taken to be
representative of the behavioural approach, which they take to its logical

36.
37.
38,

Ibid at 1525-6.
For example, model building isthe stated object ofJST, ibid. at 1475.
iid
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conclusion. Here the scientific themes mentioned above are particularly
relevant, for it is not rejection but reform that is indicated, and refon in
this instance can only mean government intervention. For present purposes
let us assume that government interention in the market is capable of
doing good, ignoring ideological statements to the contrary for the time
being. Assuming this presumptive good of intervention allows for a clearer
analysis of what exactly is so troubling about the implications of following
the behavioural approach to its logical and systematic conclusion. Namely,
it is impossible to derive consistent principles of regulation from a
haphazard definition of individuality.
The most common criticism of the proposed behavioural approach
has been, unsurprisingly, that it does not offer a theory of individual
behaviour." Even though evidence which contradicts individual rationality
is often accepted by both critics and proponents of economic theory alike,
anomalies of rational self-interest continue to be seen as largely exceptions
to the rule. The inability of behavioural scholars to offer a coherent theory
has been claimed to leave them offering nothing more than a laundry list"
of quibbling exceptions to a useful and poN\ erful rule.4" Yet, apart from the
predilection of academics for straightforw~ard, or even axiomatic, theories,
the lack of behavioural theory is emblematic of the unprincipled direction
of its approach. While I do not presume that it "takes a theory to beat a
theory," the behavioural case may indicate that an augmented half-theory
is worse than no theory at all. The behavioural approach is an unfortunate
half-solution: it is neither consistent \\ith free-market liberalism, nor is
it premised upon principles of individuality that are non-economic in
nature.
Behavioural scholars wish to maintain the market ends of law
and economics, but in qualifying its assumptions of individuality the
justificatory basis for market coordination is lost, and is not replaced by
any other principle. The prescripti--e behavioural model seeks to advance
the utility of everyone, but misses the essential presumption of economic
liberalism which sees the best results occur by each pursuing their own free
and self-interested choice in the market. By assuming the government can
approximate this utility of \%elfare, the behavioural approach is open to the
charge that it offers regulation without guidance, or coherence. Without
a distinct conception of individuality, or of any social good that would
take priority over it, the behavioural view of pragmatic regulation may
Posner, supra note I & Issacharoff, supra note 3.
39. See e.g.,
40. The term "laundry list" is taken from Colin Camerer, Samuel IssacharoffE George Loe\ Cnstein,
Ted O'Donoghue & Mathew Rabin, "Regulation for Con.'erxatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,"' (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211; (which refers to the common
complaints leveled against the early behavioural economics).
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be everything and nothing at once." Individuals are rational sometimes,
irrational at other times, and a paternalistic government should decide
when individuals need help in getting their own self-interest right. The
rational choice model is consistent in ways that the behavourial approach
cannot hope to be, for how can one reject the notion that individuals are
rational maximizers of their preferences, and then argue for government
to regulate as if individuals are, or worse, should be, maximizers of their
under-appreciated interests'?
While behavioural scholars are justified in criticizing classical law
and economics for deriving an ought from an incorrect is, they paint
themselves into a conceptual corner by maintaining the theoretical ends
of maximization. The wider system of economic liberalism is thought
to properly inform social objectives, the ultimate good as it were, but
government intervention is required in instances of individual irrationality
in order to help people choose in accordance with what ought to be in their
best interest. If government regulation is better in certain instances, how is
it to proceed, or be articulated, from a vacant conception of individuality?
What is to inform, and what are to be the priorities, of this government
intervention? And most significantly. whatjustification is there for irrational
individuals being led to different ends than those of their own choosing
by equally irrational bureaucrats? As Posner observes insightfully, the
beha%ioural approach, when offering a regulatory guide," is premised upon
a logical inconsistency. For if individuals are conceived of as irrational in
nature, what is the sense in relying upon equally irrational individuals in
bureaucratic roles to correct these instances of irrationality?
The central assumptions of economic theory, which sees atomistic
individuals competing separately as the best possible means of attaining
proper social distributions, are discarded by the behavioural approach in
an incongruous attempt to retain the outcomes of free-market competition.
A logical inconsistency thus occurs as behavioural scholars advocate
systemic ends that are not supported by any sensible justification premised
upon a notion of individuality. Whatever its faults, at least classical law
and economics has a consistent connection between assumptions about
individual behaviour and the desired form of competition. Behavioural law
and economics, on the other hand, simply assumes the systemic ends of
the classical paradigm without any thought to the need to have principles
of individuality consistent with the regulation of individuals.
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Posner, supra note I.

42, Mid While Posner is responding to JST specifically, the argument would seemingly hold for any
attcmpt to rcl'rm law and economics in the same prescriptise manner.
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Whereas classical law and economics offers a dependent theory of
the self, explaining behaviour as a dependent part of a system of market
exchange, the behavioural approach introduces an unsupported faith in
bureaucratic tinkering. The behavioural approach leads to an admittedly
paternalistic model of governance, with JST suggesting an ideal of
regulatory bodies that are insulated from populist expressions of public
opinion." - This paternalism is decidedly Keynesian in character, reflecting
a previous era's faith in the abilit\ of enlightened civil servants to
regulate the great and uneducated mass. But free market ends without free
market assumptions are simply paternalism in the most negative sense
of the term. In this one respect, it is not difficult to be sympathetic to
Posner's preference for a system which assumes individual rationality,
despite its undeniable failures, over a system premised on the notion that
individuals do not know Nhat is best for themselves and require others
to correct their misapprehensions." Unless and until paternalistic drives
are bound to principled \ alues inherent to each individual, assumptions
on the benign wisdom of bureaucrats are at best nai'\e, and at worst
authoritarian. For without a principled standard that is said to emanate
from an individual's innate uniqueness, and thereby forming the limits of
government interpretation, the relativistic claims of w'hat is best for each
are irretrievably arbitrary.
It is not difficult to imagine a world guided by behavioural law and
economics, for it would most likely mirror the current state of affairs. One
need only imagine a world \ here markets determine most relationships
and valuations, in which sporadic government action attempts to correct
the market in the most socially egregious, or politically profitable, areas.
With no other ends than a vague goal of making the current status quo work
better, the result is predictably haphazard. or \%orse: it may be a distorting
practice of influence-peddling. When considering a system of enlightened
bureaucracy, as with Keynes and the beha\ ioural scholars, those of a
cynical frame of mind might be forgiven for thinking immediately of
public choice economics and its sceptical view of government regulation.
Under the theory of public choice, political actors are thought to act
as economic actors do, maximizing their political self-interest."' This
political maximization manifests itself in the furtherance of that which
increases the possibility of continued electoral success; and in these times
43. JST, supra note 2 at 1544.
44. This generally describes the tenor of Posner's cntique of JST, Posner, supra note 1. For JST's
response, see their "Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman" (1997-1998) 50 Stan. L
Rev. 1593.
45. See e.g., James M. Buchanan. Libert: AfrAei and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (New
York: New York University Press, 1986).
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of expensive campaigning, this corresponds increasingly with catering
to sectoral interests. The great insight of public choice is the contrast
between diffuse and specific economic interests. Issues that may be of
minor concern to most may be of intense interest to a few. This inevitably
leads to a distorting influence of lobbying. The relatively minor impact
of dairy subsidies on the population at large in the form of a few cents
per person, contrasted against the tremendous profitability that accrues to
the business that benefits from this aided competition serves as a good
illustration. The sectoral interest thus benefits from the relative unconcern
of the many, even as it is contrary to their self-interest, and the relative
ease of civil servants in catering to the monied lobbying of the intense
and specific. Within this cynical vieN of government procurement, there
exists a potentially fatal exception to the hyper-rational bureaucrat who
is supposedly able to further the best interests of citizens in a selfless and
altruistic manner.
The merits of government intervention in the economy should be by no
means rejected outright, as the most extreme libertarians would have it, but
it is inconsistent to premise that intervention on nothing more than helping
individuals act consistently with what their self-interest should be. Quite
simply, if individuals do not act in accordance with notions of economic
theory, why impose this behaviour? The behavioural approach, in seeking
to only qualify a system of rational maximization, have joined the best
of intentions wvith an unsupportable conclusion of regulatory corrections.
Were it to be more, the behavioural approach would need to step out from
under the assumptions of classical theory and consider how the evidence
of irrationality signals something separate from the systemic status quo.
Until and unless a new direction of individuality is signalled, behavioural
law and economics risks being safely ignored as the manifestation of an
academic fad of limited time and use.
V. The Ultimatum Game and Simultaneous ilhtues
The ultimatum game is well on its way to catching up to the famous
prisoner's dilemma as the exemplar of behaviour inconsistent with rational
maximization.' Despite its prominence, however, the ultimatum game
remains grouped in the same class as other instances of irrationality, such
as those mentioned above. Yet it is not its popularity, but the uniqueness
of the ultimatum game that deserves special attention; and the following
section attempts to remedy this deficiency.

,lartin A. Nom ak, Karen M. Page & Karl Sigmund, "'Fairness Versus Reason inthe Ultimatum
Game INSept. 200(0) 289 Science 1773.
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In looking to the ultimatum game, the missed potential ofthe behavioural
approach becomes most evident. Unlike many instances of indikidual
irrationality, the ultimatum game reveals a continuum of value preferences
w ithin individual choice and beha\ iour - it is not just a case of individuals
giving undue preference to stubborn and uninformed assessments of
themselves within the market. Rather, the ultimatum displays self-interest
as a significant, but conditional thought. Values other than self-interest,
namely concerns for fairness, may influence individual behaviour given
the opportunity. Therefore, it is opportunity that is the most important
feature in the determination of individual behaviour and the articulation of
group values. In the following discussion of the ultimatum game, the well
known results of past and oft-repeated experiments will be considered
with a new vieN\ to opportunity. and the dependent constellation of value
preferences.
Although the implications of the ultimatum game are complex, the
game itself is v'env straightforward. - Two individuals play a game of offer
and acceptance. Person A, the proposer. is given a sum to be shared with
player B, the responder. A may divide the sum in any way she chooses,
but wvith the important caveat that B must approve of the distribution.
Should B accept A's offer they each keep their agreed-upon share. Most
significantly, if B rejects the offer neither play gets anything - the sum
returns to the "house." or whatever entity is controlling the game, usually
a university professor. Suppose A is given ten dollars, and subsequently
decides to offer B two. If B accepts. then A = Xand B = 2. If B declines A's
offer, the result is 0,0. Therefore, the rational object for A is to predict, and
then offer, the minimum amount that is likel\ to be acceptable to B. B's
rational strategy is much simpler in a one-round game,"5 only requiring a
decision as to whether they \\ ould be better off accepting the offer.
The conclusion of these rational strategies, as predicted by economic
theory. should be as straightforward as the game itself: A should offer as
close to zero as possible, say one cent, and B should accept it, always.
The reasoning is simple enough, for one cent is greater than zero - what
B had before the game and would have should they reject A's offer.
However, experimental evidence reveals economic theory's prediction to
be a very bad one. In the study conducted by JST responders (party B)
were typically found to reject offers that were less than twenty percent
of the total sum, while on average they claimed that an amount between
47. Richard Thaler gives a good account of the ultimatum game, including the efforts of some game
theorists to rescue" the rationality assumption by directing their subjects toward it. Richard Thaler,
"The Ultimatum Game" (1998) 2 J. Economic Perspectives 195.
48. Two and multiple round versions have been de' ised as %cll, see Thaler, ibid.
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twenty and thirty percent is the minimum that they would accept.4 9As it is
highly unlikely that the test results may be explained by subject's lacking
the mathematical sophistication to grasp that .01 is greater than zero, one
must assume that there are considerations more important to responders
than pure maximization. Additionally, JST observe that the participants'
desire to arrive at results they perceive to be fair is quite resilient, even
as conditions are altered to be more conducive to accepting less by either
enticing with larger sums or ensuring anonymity. 0
One of the most interesting dynamics of the ultimatum experiments
occurs through the introduction by JST of an increased possessive stake
in the distribution. JST ran a second version of the game that saw the
ten dollar amount contributed equally by players A and B, instead of the
game's administrator. In this second game, the minimum demands of B
increased dramatically." As JST predicted, when individuals contributed
their own money they acted as if they had a greater "entitlement" to a fair
distribution than when the game was more hypothetical. 2 Accordingly, the
minimum demands of B in this second version were much higher; with a
significant percentage demanding five, and the average moving from just
below two to over four." While imputing a greater element of possession,
or entitlement, into the ultimatum game was a brilliant move on the part
of JST, it could be said that the implications are under-utilized by the
idea's authors. JST treat the increased average demands by responders
as strengthening the case against rational maximization, and further
supporting the evidence of fairness considerations in decision-making.
But this can readily be agreed to and still leave much unsaid.
JST seem to conceive of fairness and self-interest as separate, and
mutually exclusive values. This may explain their object of illuminating
the cases when maximization does not hold while acknowledging the
greater systemic legitimacy of maximization. Rational self-interest in this
way occupies a binary relationship, as in on-off, with irrational values
such as fairness. In this behavioural world there are times that self-interest
works, and times that it does not, period. But while the ultimatum game
undermines the rationality precepts of economic theory, it does not do
so completely. It is significant to note that while the responders B would
not accept any amount, as predicted by economic theory, neither do they
demand an equal share, say five dollars out often. At some point between
49.

JS1, supra note 2 at 149().
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five dollars and one cent, rational self-interest is supplanted by concerns
for fairness. But fairness does not hold completely, fbr if it did individuals
would accept nothing less than a equal sharing of five dollars; nor does
rational self-interest, since responders on average Nrill not accept anything
below' tw enty percent, or two dollars. So if A offers three dollars and B
accepts (as experiments indicate they %Nould),A is able to keep seven
dollars. Self-interest would explain B's decision while pure fairness would
seemingly not. Alternatively. ifA offers two dollars, and B rejects it, fairness
may then replace financial self-interest as the rationale. Similarly, while I
have concentrated on the responder alone, should A offer five, this would
correspond with fairness considerations rather than pure self-interest.
The simultaneous spheres of interest perception re. ealed by the
Ultimatum game may be imagined along a simple continuum. In the case
of the ten dollar game, minimum demands which are closer to zero than
five, say one, display a self-interest priority, while those that approach an
even distribution reflect fairness priorities. Perhaps the most significant
implication of the Ultimatum game is that the simultaneous spheres of
interest perception are not fixed, but fluctuate along the continuum when
the context of the game is changed. Altering the game so as to promote
individual identification \\ ith the sums involved re\ ealed a greater space
for fairness along the continuum (roughly from 2.5 to 4 in the JTS study).
If spheres of interception may fluctuate to the benefit of fairness, or
whatever "irrational' value inspires people to act contrary to maximization,
it follows that the re\erse may also be true. Although not covered in the
study by JST, it might be worthw hile to question if the game's structure
could not be altered to all but eliminate fairness from the continuum of
interest perception. Suppose that once again the dollar amounts are not
contributed by the participants, but that this time the subjects change from
students at prestigious American universities (the subject pool for JST's
study :" ) and are instead individuals suffering from abject poverty. And
though experimental work in this area would no doubt be beneficial, it
is not difficult to imagine that extreme material \rant would constrain the
ability of an individual to reject monetary offers for the sake of fairness.
In this sense, the intensity of material want would render concerns for
fairness an impossible luxury.
The most interesting aspect of the JST variation, in my opinion, is that
it displays movement. More than simply indicating the strength of fairness
concerns, as JST claim, the second variation reveals the importance of
game rules on individual perception. JST allowed, or promoted, greater
54. The group was comprised of University of Chicago MBA students, MIT MBA students, and
University of Chicago law students, see JST, supra note 2 at 1491.
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identification with the sums involved, and fairness impulses were indicated.
But promoting greater identification with the sums, as with individuals
in desperate need of any basic amount, could equally send results in the
other direction. Comparing these two different forms of external influence
indicates that the surrounding context or starting position of the game
dictates the likelihood that certain values may manifest themselves in
behaviour. Affluent students were both encouraged, and able, to exercise
a strategy contrary to maximization for the sake of fairness, or some
principle known only to them. Destitute subjects would not have the same
opportunity. Self-interest or fairness could equally appear in the same
game depending upon the contextual opportunities of participants.
Conclusion
If individual behaviour is not binary and exclusive in nature, but is instead
simultaneous and situational, then the premise of the behavioural approach
is flawed.5 - By taking an instrumental view of competition, and adopting
the limited aim of helping individuals get it right within the existing theory
of maximization, behavioural scholars have missed the potential of their
own source material. The behavioural approach is directed toward varying
forms of regulation, as when rationality does or does not hold, but in
keeping the same ends as law and economics no real variation is possible.
The potential displayed in the ultimatum game, that individuals contain
simultaneously different value priorities, is therefore lost in conforming
to neo-liberal assumptions. No distinct pattern of thought is furthered
when the highest ideal of regulation is correcting irrational behaviour. By
looking to instances when irrationality may signal something more than
misconceived self-interest, as with the ultimatum game, larger questions
of systemic priority are necessarily invoked. Evidence of variable values
within the same game indicates that we must choose between competing
theories of the self and the ends desirable to individuals, not between
regulatory instruments of rationality versus irrationality. Rather than
accepting the legitimacy of maximization, it would be better to consider
which situations illustrate that maximization is being imposed at the
expense of other principles that may equally represent individuality, and
perhaps be of greater benefit to society.

55. By binary and exclusive I mean that it isa one to one relationship: with one present the other may
not bc By simultancous and situational I mean that depending on the setting of the game, its secondary
rules in a sense, the strategies could fluctuate between different priorities. Simultaneous, therefore,
retirs to the potential that different values may appear in the same instance depending on the game's
setting,

